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Abstract: The sharp decline in Ireland's economic performance in recent years has 
coincided with a recent fall in asylum applications. Simultaneously countries such as 
Switzerland are seeing increases in asylum numbers with evidence for greater numbers of 
Nigerian applicants, a group that have for some time been the largest nationality group 
applying in Ireland. A possible reason for this shift in asylum seeker preference is the 
general economic conditions here versus those in other European countries. In this paper 
we investigate whether this belief holds water. We model asylum applications as a function 
of GDP using a time varying parameter multiplicative growth model. Our results show 
there is an economic basis for asylum seeker preferences. We further show there is no 
regional basis for asylum seekers' expectation of a more favourable claim in the 'developed 
box' in central Europe as compared to countries on the so-called 'periphery'. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Modern migration tends to involve considerable 
temporary movements for family purposes, work 
or study and therefore the impact of migration 
on the home and host countries can differ to that 
observed in permanent migration, see Barret & 
Goggin (2010). For example, temporary 
migrants may repatriate a lot more of their 
income than long term permanent migrants. 
Nevertheless, the link between permanent or 
temporary migration and incomes or economic 
well being is well established and underpinned 
by the reality that migration occurs if the net 
present value of earnings in the host country, 
exceeds that of the migrants home country, see 
Sjaastad (1962). 
 
In contrast the reasons for asylum movements 
are less well understood. Research on asylum 
tends to be advocacy based and focused on 
persons fleeing persecution with the overall 
objective of instigating change, Hughes & Quinn 
(2004). The evidence for this is clear from 
numerous articles in the past few years in, for 
example, the Journal of Refugee Studies. As a 
consequence, a balanced view of the true reasons 
behind asylum migration remains unclear. 
Clearly then, some persons are refugees but 
others who claim to be are not. These may well 
be asylum applicants who are in fact economic 
migrants and the reality underpinning their 
movement is simply the expectation of better 
incomes. In this paper we examine this claim. 
An economic motivation may also partly explain 
why some asylum seekers look to 'cheat the 
system', see Kibreab (2004).  
 
Asylum seekers throughout the EEA make an 
application for international protection that is 
considered in the context of the 1951 UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol. Individual states make 
their determination and grant or refuse refugee 
status. While the UNHCR monitors the 
determination procedure in each country, rates 
of success reported to Eurostat vary across the 
EEA. Among the main reasons for this are the 
procedural basis for decision and methods of 
reporting are not identical - some countries for 
example have more elaborate procedures than 
others. Detailed accounts of individual country 
procedures are set out in the Asylum Procedures 
Manual (IGC 2009).  
 
Figure 1 
Asylum Applications and GDP (volumes) per capita PPS
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Of course, asylum applications are determined 
by many factors. In Ireland's case, constitutional 
and legislative changes such as the amendment 
on eligibility for citizenship, the introduction of 
carrier liability, the habitual residency condition 
and streamlining of processing procedures, 
permanently reduce the overall level. In 
contrast, economic conditions persistent and 
therefore may be a key factor determining 
application numbers over time.  
 
The empirical evidence for a link between 
economic well being and asylum applications is 
perceptible in Ireland. In the early nineties 
asylum application numbers in Ireland were 
negligible. Through the second half of that 
decade numbers rose steadily to reach a peak of 
over 11,635 in 2002 (see Figure 1). After that 
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numbers began to decline rapidly through 2003 
and 2004, probably linked to legislative changes 
and then remained at around 4,000 up to 2008. 
In 2009 numbers fell dramatically to 2,689, a 
30% drop on 2008. Coincidentally, over the past 
15 years Ireland has seen its economy go from 
low to high and 'tiger' levels of growth and then 
back to low growth and recession. Evidently, the 
existence of these coincidental trends suggests 
the possibility of a link or level of causality 
between economic well being and asylum 
application numbers. 
 
In this paper we conduct a country by country 
analysis to establish a link between economic 
well being and asylum application numbers for 
Ireland and other EEA countries. Specifically we 
examine whether economic well being as 
measured by per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) volumes in Purchasing Power Standards 
(PPS) is a factor determining asylum application 
numbers in Ireland and other EEA countries. 
For many EEA countries this link is 
demonstrated showing that the expectation of 
better incomes is a key reality underpinning 
asylum movements.  
 
On a purely technical point Gross National 
Product (GNP) is the preferred measure of a 
country's 'economic attractiveness'. However, 
historic data series of per capita GNP volumes 
in PPS are readily not available. Therefore we 
opt for per capita GDP volumes in PPS as our 
measure of economic well being. Crucially this 
includes net income flows such as repatriated 
profits made by multinationals which for Ireland 
are substantial. 
 
Clearly, if economic well being is a predictor of 
asylum flows then those countries with highest 
relative incomes should attract more asylum 
seekers. We examine this by comparing the ratio 
of per capita asylum applications and per capita 
GDP in PPS across EEA countries. Our analysis 
is based on smoothed ratios obtained by 
adopting a linear time-varying parameter model 
to describe this relationship. On this basis we 
highlight those countries that take a greater 
share of asylum applicants in terms of their 
GDP. 
 
Our focus then turns to questions of causality. 
We look for unit roots and cointegration in the 
time series and test for the presence of Granger-
causality using an error correcting model. Then 
we proceed to investigate the exact nature of the 
relationship between per capita asylum 
application numbers and per capita GDP in PPS 
in the previous year. Here we assume a 
multiplicative model for the relationship and 
once again adopt a time-varying parameter 
growth model in the logs to describe it. The 
model is put in state-space form and the 
parameters themselves are estimated with the 
aid of the Kalman Filter, see Harvey (1993). 
             
The movement described by the time-varying 
parameters that results from fitting the model is 
analysed to see if there is a significant 
relationship between asylum applications and 
GDP. The evolution of the parameter also allows 
us to assess the nature of that relationship 
through time. Our model also incorporates 
changing variance and so we are able to see 
whether uncertainty about economic well being 
in the host country influences asylum 
applications. The underlying idea here is that 
greater uncertainty about future economic 
conditions will negatively impact on asylum 
movements and so cause applications to fall.       
 
This paper is structured as follows; in the next 
section we review our data sources. In Section 3 
we look at asylum application trends and loosely 
cluster EEA countries accordingly. We follow 
this by modelling the ratio of per capita asylum 
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applications and per capita GDP in PPS to see if 
there is a difference between countries asylum 
applications in terms of their GDP. In Section 5 
we adopt a constant elasticity model to describe 
the relationship between asylum applications 
and GDP and use it to examine issues relating 
to Granger-causality in Section 6. Finally we use 
the multiplicative growth model to examine the 
nature of the relationship between GDP and 
asylum applications in each EEA country. This 
model and the associated methodology are 
described in Sections 7 while conclusions are set 
out in Section 8.    
 
 
 
2. Data Sources 
 
Three main sources of data are used for 
conducting the analysis in this paper. These are: 
• Yearly asylum application numbers 
covering 1985 or later to 2009: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/p
age/portal/population/data/database 
 
• Population number in each year:  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/p
age/portal/population/data/database 
 
• Yearly GDP in PPS (constant volume): 
Gapminder.org: The data in this 
dataset is based on GDP per capita, in 
fixed 2005 prices, and is adjusted for 
Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs), as 
calculated in the 2005 round of the 
International Comparison Program 
(ICP) taken from the Penn World 
Tables Version 6.2. 
This data source is augmented via 
regression with GDP per capita for 
more recent years from Eurostat 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/p
age/portal/national_accounts/data/datab
ase 
   
For the purposes of this analysis GDP and 
where appropriate asylum applications are 
standardised by dividing each by the overall 
population giving per capita GDP and per capita 
asylum applications per 10,000 population 
respectively. All data are further standardised 
by dividing by the EU-27 average multiplied by 
100. 
 
The data series are short. In Ireland's case they 
cover 1992-2009 with reliable asylum figures 
only available from 1995 onward. For this 
reason our comparisons are made based on data 
and results over the period from 1997 or 1998 
onward - the reason for this is that we drop the 
first few estimated values obtained by the 
models to allow for run-in.    
 
3. Asylum application trends in EEA countries 
 
Map 1 provides a relative comparison of per 
capita asylum applications made in Ireland with 
per capita asylum applications made in other 
EEA countries. Countries are coloured based on 
the proportion of years in the 13 year period 
1997-2009 where the per capita asylum 
applications was significantly different to 
Ireland's (i.e. the proportion of years where per 
capita asylum applications in that country were 
statistically not equal to Ireland). 
 
A straightforward binomial test of each 
country’s proportion loosely clusters Austria, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland into a set that 
have significantly higher asylum applications 
per head than Ireland. Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands have similar asylum 
patterns to Ireland while the remaining 
countries including UK, France, Germany, Italy 
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and Spain comprise a group that have lower 
asylum applications per head than Ireland. 
Cyprus, Greece and Malta however have a 
different pattern to these three groups with high 
levels of application only since 2004.  
 
Map 1: per capita Asylum applications in EEA 
countries relative to Ireland 
 
 
 
Computing the average of the ratios over the 
period 1997-2009 (see Appendix Table A1) we 
find that for Austria, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland the odds of an asylum application 
being made there is nearly double that of an 
application being made in Ireland on a per 
capita basis. For the group with lower per capita 
asylum applications compared to Ireland (i.e. 
including UK, France and Germany) the odds of 
asylum application being made in Ireland is 
generally over twice that of any one of these 
countries. 
 
The graphs displayed in Figure 2 are a sample 
of 'typical' asylum applications per 10,000 of 
population (all plots are standardised to have a 
mean and standard deviation of 0 and 1 
respectively). Ireland's asylum data only 
becomes important after the mid-nineties. It is 
clear that from that point onward a similar 
pattern is observed to Holland which is in the 
same group (i.e. having a similar per capita 
application level), except that applications in 
Ireland tend to lag Dutch applications by about 
2 years. The rise to a peak in the period 1998 to 
2002 followed by a rapid fall is also clearly 
evident from the other plots. 
 
All countries plotted show a sharp rise to a peak 
in asylum applications in the early nineties; 
these trends are typical of the application 
profiles in most EEA states. Germany also 
displays the early nineties peak but in this 
instance there is a sustained declined from 
about 1994 onward - reasons for this provided 
privately to the author include the introduction 
of tighter asylum procedures in the nineties. The 
subgroup showing higher asylum applications 
than Ireland which includes Switzerland 
typically also show a new rise from about 2006 
or 2007 onward that is not evident for other 
countries. Interestingly, the timing of two 
largest asylum application peaks for 
Switzerland tend to lead those of most other 
countries by a year or two - this may be a 
leading indicator of increases in asylum 
applications in other EEA states.  
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 Figure 2 
Standardised per capita Asylum Applications in the EU
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4. Asylum application to GDP in PPS ratios in 
EEA countries 
 
Clearly, if economic well being is related to 
asylum flows then those countries with highest 
relative incomes should attract more asylum 
seekers per capita. This in turn should mean 
that there is a regional distribution of asylum 
applications with countries in the 'core' urban 
so-called 'developed box' that runs from London 
to Berlin and Stockholm to Milan, see Patrakos 
et. al. (2005) attracting more applications 
relative to their GDP than 'periphery' countries. 
In this section we examine whether there is a 
regional basis for asylum applications based on 
each EEA country’s GDP. 
 
Our approach is to compare the ratio of per 
capita asylum application and per capita GDP in 
PPS across countries and directly identify those 
countries that take a greater share of asylum 
applicants in terms of their GDP. Of course for 
these quantities long-run non-zero linear lag 
cross-correlations exist but analysis shows there 
is little evidence for short term stochastic cross-
correlations. According to Harvey (1990) 
characterising the exact nature of this type of 
non-stationary relationship when data series are 
short, as is the case here with 25 or fewer 
observations, is typically best accomplished 
using an appropriate state-space model. 
Adopting this approach, if we denote each time 
point (i.e. year) by the time variable t  and label 
per capita asylum application numbers by tY   
and per capita GDP in PPS by ,tX  then the 
crude ratio of asylum to GDP, denoted by tr  is 
simply 
                               
t
t
t X
Y
r =                           (1)                                                 
(note: the population element cancels out in the 
above calculation).  
Our preference is to work with smoothed ratios, 
so using this as our basis we can define a simple 
time-varying parameter regression model 
(through the origin) for the smoothed ratio ,tρ  
expressed in state-space form as 
 
Measurement Eqn: 
[ ][ ] tttt exy += − ρ1       (2a) 
( )2,0~ et N σε  
 
Transition Eqn:   
( ) [ ]( ) ( )ttt n+= −11 ρρ       (2b) 
( )2,0~ ρσNnt  
 
Here the smoothed ratio tρ  is allowed to vary 
according to a random walk with the variance of 
this process
2
nσ  assumed different and 
independent of the variance of the asylum 
process .2eσ  
 
The time-varying parameters in this model are 
estimated in R, Ihaka and Gentleman (1996) 
using a Kalman Filter, Harvey (1993) and the 
variance parameters are the maximum 
likelihood estimates of 2eσ  and 
2
ρσ  available 
from the prediction error decomposition of the 
likelihood obtained via the Kalman Filter, see 
Harvey (1993). These were estimated using the 
Optim function in R using appropriate starting 
values. In Figure 3 we provide an example plot 
of the actual crude ratio tr  and the smoothed 
ratio tρ  for the Netherlands. The smoothing is 
clear from the plot with the peaks and troughs 
being undershot as the excess noise is damped 
down at these time points. 
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Figure 3: Plot of crude and smoothed asylum to 
GDP ratios for the Netherlands 
Crude and Smoothed Asylum to GDP Ratios
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Map 2 shows a relative comparison of the 
smoothed per capita asylum applications to per 
capita GDP in PPS ratios in Ireland and in other 
EEA countries. Once again the colouring reflects 
the proportion of years (1997-2009) where this 
ratio was statistically not equal to one (i.e. the 
per capita asylum applications to GDP ratio in a 
particular country in that year was different to 
Ireland). 
 
Statistical analysis of the ratios based on a 
straightforward binomial test forms 4 simple 
groups. The first of these includes Austria, 
Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland. These 
comprise a group that have significantly higher 
asylum applications in relation to their national 
income/wealth per head than Ireland. Based on 
the average ratio over the time period (see 
Appendix Table A2) these countries typically 
have in excess of 1.8 times as many applications 
per head in relation to their wealth. The bulk of 
European countries including UK, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain tend to have 
fewer asylum applications in relation to their 
income. Interestingly, this group also comprises 
most of the former Eastern European block. For 
these countries the applications per head is just 
under half that of Ireland's. Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Slovakia have similar 
per capita application levels to Ireland when 
compared to their wealth. The Eastern 
Mediterranean group also have much higher 
applications per head but here high ratios 
persist only since 2004.  
 
Map 2: Smoothed per capita Asylum 
applications to GDP ratios in EEA countries 
relative to Ireland 
 
 
This analysis of per capita asylum applications 
in terms of national income/wealth shows that 
Austria, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland are 
the only countries in the 'developed box' that 
take a larger relative proportion than Ireland. 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands are the only 
countries in the 'developed box' that take a 
similar number of applications in relation to 
their wealth as Ireland. While the UK, 
Denmark, France and Germany take 
significantly fewer applications compared to 
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Ireland. Clearly there is no regional pattern to 
asylum applications in terms of national wealth 
and the notion  that better off countries, i.e. 
those in the 'developed box', are more attractive 
to asylum seekers is partially true but cannot be 
sustained across all developed regions. 
Additional factors must therefore contribute to 
explain the regional distribution of asylum 
applications. A particularly striking example is 
asylum applications in Germany where the 
figures in Table A2 (see Appendix) show a 
steady decline since 1998 - as mentioned above, 
reasons for this provided privately to the author 
include the introduction of tighter asylum 
procedures.  
 
5. A constant elasticity model for Asylum and 
GDP 
 
In this section we hypothesis that there is a 
constant elasticity or multiplicative growth 
relationship between per capita asylum 
application numbers and per capita GDP in PPS 
described by the following equation: 
                                                                       
( )ωµ tt XY ×= exp           (3)                                          
This equation states that the average per capita 
asylum application level ( )Y  is a polynomial 
function of per capita GDP in PPS ( )X  or 
equivalently the relationship is log-log. Here 
also µ   is a constant and ω  is a constant 
parameter representing the elasticity between 
per capita asylum application numbers and per 
capita GDP in PPS. Thus we assume that the 
ratio of the relative growth rate between per 
capita asylum application numbers and per 
capita GDP in PPS is constant. Clearly, this 
model is restrictive and neglects other variables 
that may influence asylum application. Allowing 
for this, in this paper our focus is on studying 
the relationship in equation (3).   
 
Figure 4: Plot of the log of asylum versus GDP 
for Ireland 
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Conceptually we might say that (3) express that 
GDP expansion leads to higher incomes relative 
to an asylum seekers home country and this is 
reflected in relative increases in asylum seeker 
preferences and causes growth in asylum seeker 
numbers in the host country. Notwithstanding 
this, the relationship in (3) is justified on 
empirical grounds. Taking logs of (3) we have 
                   tt xy ωµ +=                 (4) 
where ( )tt Yy log=  and ( ).log tt Xx =  In 
Figure 4 the plot of these two variables for 
Ireland shows a strong linear tendency 
providing evidence for constant elasticity. That 
said, it is also clear that there is a tendency for 
values to fall below or above the trend line in 
clusters suggesting the errors may not be 
independent or identically distributed. 
 
 
6. Unit roots, Cointegration and Granger-
causality 
 
In this section we examine the nature of the 
linear dynamic relationship expressed in (4) 
between logged per capita asylum application 
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numbers and logged per capita GDP in PPS for 
each individual EEA country. We follow 
Narayan and Smyth (2004) and use a three 
stage procedure. First we examine whether 
these two variables are integrated using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test available in the R 
language, Ihaka and Gentleman (1996). The 
results of these tests at the 5% significance level 
are reported in Table A3a. For the most part 
results are as expected as they show that both 
per capita asylum applications and per capita 
GDP in PPS are integrated order 1. However, for 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia the asylum 
applications variable is stationary while more 
strikingly for Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece 
and Poland per capita GDP in PPS appears 
stationary. Of these the conclusion of the test for 
Germany would conflict most with expectations. 
We have also conducted unit root test using the 
Elliot Rothenburg and Stock (1996) DF-GLS test 
available in the R language, Ihaka and 
Gentleman (1996). This test has greater power 
in small samples. Table 3b gives the results 
which show that asylum applications in all but 3 
countries are stationary. The results for GDP 
are largely similar to those obtained using the 
ADF test.    
 
The second step in our examination involves 
testing for long-run equilibrium relationships 
between per capita asylum applications and per 
capita GDP in PPS in logs. We employ the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bound 
testing procedure of Pesaran, Shin & Smith 
(2001). This procedure has a few attractive 
features including that it allows cointegration 
relationships to be estimated by OLS, the 
approach is applicable whether the regressors in 
the model are stationary or integrated order 1, 
and the test is relatively more efficient in small 
sample sizes. The ARDL approach is employed 
by computing the F-statistic based on comparing 
the following conditional error correction 
representations: 
                       
tt
p
i
iti
p
i
itittt
uxx
yyxcy
+∆+∆
+∆+++=∆
∑
∑
−
=
−
−
=
−−−
φϕ
ψβα
1
1
1
1
110
      (5a) 
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i
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i
itit
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+∆+∆
+∆+=∆
∑
∑
−
=
−
−
=
−
φϕ
ψ
1
1
1
1
0
                      (5b) 
                            
where ∆  is the usual 1st-difference operator, 
φϕψ ,,,0 iic are regression constants, 2=p  is 
the chosen lag deemed appropriate for annual 
data and ( )2,0N~ utu σ . The computed F-statistic 
is compared to the bounds given in Pesaran, 
Shin & Smith (2001) where three outcomes are 
specified. First, where the F-statistics is below 
the lower bound we accept the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration. Second, where the F-statistic is 
above the upper bound we reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of cointegration. Third, the 
F-statistics lies within the bound and the 
procedure leaves us undecided. In our case (5) 
includes a constant and no time trend so the 
bounds that apply are 3.79 – 4.85.  
 
The results of the bounds testing procedure are 
also given in Table A3. For countries where both 
per capita asylum and per capita GDP in PPS 
are integrated order 1, these results show that 
the hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for 
the Czech Rep., Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
UK and Switzerland. Thus for these countries a 
long run relationship exists between per capita 
asylum and per capita GDP in PPS when 
asylum is the dependent variable. The test was 
inconclusive for France, Italy and Norway. 
While for Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
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Denmark, Netherlands, Romania, Spain and 
Sweden there was no evidence for cointegration. 
 
The final step in our test procedure is to 
examine for Granger-causality. To do this we 
employ the following pair of ECMs: 
( ) ( )
( ) t
p
i
itxix
p
i
ityiyxtx
uxL
yLcxL
∑
∑
−
=
−
−
=
−
+−
+−+=−
1
1
)()(
1
1
)()()(
1
11
ϕ
ψ
             (6a)  
( ) ( )
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++−
+−+=−
−
−
=
−
−
=
−
∑
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1
1
1
)()(
1
1
)()()(
1
11
αϕ
ψ
       (6b) 
 
In this equation )()( and yx LL  are the lag 
operators appropriate for each country per 
capita GDP in PPS and per capita asylum 
respectively while 1−tECT  is an error correcting 
term included to account for long-run 
equilibrium relationships. We test for causality 
in the ECMs (6) by allowing the lag p to be in 
the range 1 to 4 and identifying unidirectional 
causality from Asylum → GDP, or GDP → 
Asylum and bidirectional causality between 
Asylum ↔ GDP based an the F-probability. For 
example in testing for causality from Asylum → 
GDP the F-probability compares the full model 
to a restricted model that does not include 
lagged ity −  terms. 
 
The results of the causality tests are given in 
Table A3a. First, when the 1−tECT  term was 
included it was significant at the 10% level for 
all countries except Slovakia where 
cointegration was found in the Bounds Test. 
 
Second, bidirectional causality is evident for 8 
countries including Ireland, Estonia, Finland, 
Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Spain and 
Switzerland. Unidirectional causality from 
Asylum → GDP is evident for Austria, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Unidirectional causality from GDP → Asylum is 
evident from Belgium, Czech Rep., France, 
Sweden and the UK while the remaining 
countries show no evidence of causality. 
 
Third, in general for countries that showed 
causality from Asylum → GDP either as bi or 
unidirectional, the lag where causality was 
found was either 1 or 2 years previously. For the 
most part the same lag applied for countries 
that showed causality from GDP → Asylum. 
Causality at short lags is direct evidence for the 
short-term or stochastic relationship between 
per capita asylum and per capita GDP in PPS. 
Interestingly though the UK and Sweden buck 
this trend with causality showing at lag 4 
hinting that it might be necessary to include a 
time trend in (6) or that parameter estimates 
over the period may be unstable. 
 
It is also interesting to note that when the 
causality results in Table 3a are compared with 
those of Table 3b based on the Elliot Rothenburg 
Stock unit root test the results are remarkably 
similar. We are however aware that the absence 
of cointegration for some countries, including 
Ireland, based on Elliot Rothenburg Stock test 
results calls into questions the evidence for 
causality. Furthermore, we have used standard 
F-probabilities and in cases where both 
variables are cointegrated the test statistics may 
not have a standard F-distribution.    
 
7. Asylum and GDP elasticity and predictability 
in EEA countries 
 
In this section we model the dynamic 
relationship between per capita asylum 
application numbers and per capita GDP in PPS 
for each individual EEA country. Rather than 
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use the ECM framework adopted in the previous 
section, we model the relationships directly 
under the assumption that the elasticity is not a 
fixed constant but can vary randomly. Modelling 
the relationship directly has the advantage we 
can work with non-stationary data. It also 
allows us to directly compute the elasticity 
between GDP and asylum numbers to see if it is 
similar or different across the EEA. Indeed, the 
Granger-causality results of the previous section 
suggest we should focus our attention on the 
elasticity at short lags. So, we specifically look 
at the elasticity between last year's GDP this 
year's asylum numbers. 
 
To investigate these issues we assume that the 
following non-stationary time-varying 
parameter model describes the multiplicative 
growth relationship between per capita asylum 
application numbers and per capita GDP in 
PPS: 
                                                            
( ) ttt XY ωµ 1exp −×=                  (7)                                        
This equation states that the average per capita 
asylum application level ( )Y  is a polynomial 
function of per capita GDP in PPS ( )X  in the 
previous year. Here also 
µexp   is a constant 
and tω  is a time-varying parameter 
representing the time varying elasticity between 
per capita asylum application numbers and per 
capita GDP in PPS. 
 
Taking logs we can readily express this model in 
state space form as: 
 
Measurement Eqn:     
            [ ] t
t
t
tt xy εω
µ
+





=
−11         ( )2,0~ εσε Nt      (8a)      
 
 
 
Transition Eqn: 
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where ( )tet Yy log=  and ( ).log 11 −− = tet Xx  
Importantly, this model allows the elasticity to 
vary according to a random walk. The variance 
or uncertainty of this process 2ησ   is assumed 
different and independent of the variance of the 
asylum process 2eσ  given in equation (8a). Once 
again we implement a Kalman Filter, see 
Harvey (1993) in the R language, Ihaka and 
Gentleman (1996) to obtain the smoothed time-
varying parameters while the variance 
parameters are the maximum likelihood 
estimates of 2eσ  and 
2
ωσ   available from the 
Kalman Filter. These were estimated using the 
Optim function in R. All our model results given 
below are obtained from fitting this model to 
each country's data.  
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the results obtained when the 
time varying parameter model was fitted to each 
country's data. In the table n  is the number of 
observations while 2ˆ eσ , 
2
ˆ µσ  and
2
ˆωσ  are the 
estimated variances of the residual, the constant 
and time varying elasticity respectively. The 
filtered constant µˆ  and the average value of 
filtered elasticity tωˆ  are also given. Where this 
parameter is not significantly different from 0 
the country is shown shaded. Note that µ  is 
initially assumed stochastic and the model is re-
estimated as in equation (8) when this 
parameter is not significantly different from 0 at 
the 5% level.   
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The next two columns in Table 1 are the sum of 
the Absolute Residual Errors (ARE) and the 
Sum of Squares of the Errors (SSE), both 
expressed as a percentage of the corresponding 
sum of the per capita asylum applications. The 
column labelled Box-Pierce, Harvey (1990) is the 
outcome of the Box-Pierce test - where the null 
hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation in 
the residuals. The last column labelled ARCH 
shows whether the conditional variance is 
statistically significant. Here 'Accept' means 
that the variance and therefore uncertainty 
about future expectations changes over time. We 
note that the conditional variances of the model 
are available for free from the Kalman Filter, 
see Kim & Nelson (1999, p45).    
 
In Table 1 we can see the model has tracked the 
data for each country closely. This is evidenced 
by the fact that the estimated residual variance 
2
ˆ eσ  is small in most cases and the ARE and SSE 
are both small. In tandem with the error being 
small the Box-Pierce test shows that no 
autocorrelation was observed in the residuals. 
Therefore, the model provides a good 
representation of the data. 
 
It is also clear from Table 1 that 0ˆ 2 =µσ  in all 
cases except for Luxembourg, Spain and 
Slovenia. Thus the average level of asylum 
applications µˆ  is constant for all but these 
three countries. Moreover, the uncertainty 
associated with the estimated average levels is 
large and therefore these quantities, whether 
constant or time varying, are not statistically 
different from 0. 
 
Of primary interest is the filtered elasticity tωˆ . 
For all countries this quantity is positive while 
the variance of the slope is 0ˆ 2 >ωσ  in all cases 
except for Luxembourg, Spain and Slovenia. 
Therefore the assumed time varying 
multiplicative growth model captures the 
dynamic relationship between per capita GDP 
and per capita asylum applications for most 
EEA countries. For countries in the bottom 
group in the table the standard errors tend to 
include 0 and therefore inferences are less 
reliable. This group mainly comprise the eastern 
bloc within the EU, a reflection of the fact that 
the data series are extremely short for these 
countries. 
 
Importantly, for the 16 countries where reliable 
inferences can be made we can conclude that 
asylum applications depend on the previous 
years GDP. In particular, in Ireland's case since 
09.1ˆ =tω  we can say that a 1% increase in per 
capita GDP in PPS in any given year will 
produce 1.09% increase in per capita asylum 
applications in the following year. For other 
countries the response varies from the lowest 
group, where 1% increase in per capita GDP in 
PPS in any given year will produce 0.5% 
increase in per capita asylum applications in the 
following year, while the response in the UK is 
about 0.96%, slightly lower than Ireland's. 
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Table 1: Filtered Parameter Values from fitting the time-varying parameter model  
  MLEs of the variances 
Time varying 
parameters Model Quality/Accuracy Tests 
Country n  
2
ˆeσ  
2
ˆ µσ  2ˆωσ  µˆ  tωˆ  ARE (%) 
SSE 
(%) 
Box-
Pierce 
(Accept) 
ARCH 
(Accept) 
Cyprus  12 0.23 0.00 0.13 0.33 1.28 5.5 0.4 Y Y 
Sweden  25 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.08 1.14 11.2 2.1 Y Y 
Ireland  15 0.25 0.00 0.05 -0.07 1.09 8.3 1.1 Y N 
Norway  25 0.17 0.00 0.09 -0.23 1.08 4.6 0.4 Y Y 
Switzerland  24 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.28 1.06 5.1 0.3 Y N 
Belgium  25 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.19 1.04 4.8 0.3 Y N 
Austria  25 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.21 1.03 4.7 0.3 Y N 
Malta  13 0.23 0.00 0.10 0.59 1.03 6.4 0.6 Y Y 
Denmark  25 0.20 0.00 0.06 -0.03 1.00 8.3 0.9 Y N 
United Kingdom  25 0.22 0.00 0.08 -0.20 0.96 6.9 0.8 Y N 
Netherlands  25 0.24 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.95 9.2 1.7 Y N 
Slovakia  18 0.28 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.93 6.1 0.8 Y Y 
Poland  16 0.35 0.00 0.06 -0.67 0.89 15.6 4.4 Y N 
France  19 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.86 5.6 0.4 Y N 
Germany 25 0.23 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.83 8.2 0.7 Y N 
Finland  25 0.29 0.00 0.13 -0.26 0.79 6.9 1.1 Y Y 
Greece  25 0.29 0.00 0.12 0.54 0.74 6.9 1.1 Y N 
Czech Republic  13 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.56 0.72 8.2 1.1 Y N 
Hungary  12 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.57 0.69 7.5 0.5 Y N 
Luxembourg 25 0.24 0.51 0.00 0.97 0.67 7.4 0.8 Y N 
Spain  25 0.13 0.26 0.00 0.10 0.60 4.6 0.4 Y N 
Bulgaria  13 0.22 0.00 0.09 0.69 0.55 7.0 0.6 Y N 
Italy  25 0.66 0.00 0.94 0.37 0.55 29.1 14.2 Y Y 
Lithuania  13 0.27 0.00 0.14 0.68 0.32 8.5 1.6 Y N 
Latvia  12 0.56 0.00 0.14 -0.24 0.30 19.4 6.2 Y N 
Portugal  25 0.26 0.00 0.13 -0.56 0.30 9.7 2.8 Y N 
Slovenia  16 0.24 0.97 0.00 2.21 0.28 8.8 1.6 Y N 
Romania  19 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.70 0.23 2.5 0.1 Y N 
Estonia  12 0.28 0.00 0.09 -0.64 0.11 16.1 5.6 Y N 
 
  
 
Table 2: Actual smoothed per capita Asylum applications to GDP elasticises 2006-2009 
Year Ireland Austria Belgium Cyprus Denmark Finland France Germany 
2006 0.98 1.01 0.95 1.38 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.63 
2007 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.41 0.93 0.78 0.90 0.57 
2008 0.95 0.96 1.02 1.29 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.62 
2009 0.95 1.00 1.09 1.22 0.98 1.05 0.89 0.68 
Year Malta Netherlands Poland Slovakia Sweden UK Norway Switzerland 
2006 1.16 0.91 0.81 0.98 1.16 0.89 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.15 0.80 0.87 0.90 1.21 0.87 1.01 0.98 
2008 1.27 0.89 0.95 0.60 1.19 0.88 1.13 1.07 
2009 1.28 0.92 1.05 0.54 1.19 0.89 1.18 1.08 
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Map 3: Smoothed per capita Asylum 
applications to GDP elasticises in 
EEA countries relative to Ireland 
 
 
Using Ireland as a baseline, Map 3 (also 
Appendix Table A3) shows the geographic 
distribution of elasticity between asylum 
numbers and GDP. Once again the colouring 
reflects the proportion of years (1998-2009) 
where the elasticity relative to Ireland was 
statistically not equal to one (i.e. the asylum 
applications to GDP elasticity in a particular 
country in that year was different to Ireland). 
Statistical analysis of the elasticity ratios based 
on a straightforward binomial test forms 3 
simple groups. An appealing feature of this 
simple technique is that the first and second 
groups include 15 of the 16 countries where 
reliable inferences can be made about the 
elasticity.  Meanwhile within this 15 only the 
UK and Germany have elasticises that are 
significantly lower than Ireland based standard 
error of their elasticity.   
 
All remaining countries except Greece have a 
significantly lower response that cannot be 
distinguished from 0 given the data. In general 
therefore there is no significant difference and 
indeed there is remarkable homogeneity across 
EEA countries in relation to the response of 
asylum applications to changes in economic well 
being. This response is always positive in that 
an increase in GDP produces an increase in 
asylum applications. Interpreting this in terms 
of asylum seeker expectations, we may say this 
indicates that when there is a perception that a 
particular country's economy is growing, there 
may be a latent expectation among asylum 
applicants of a favourable outcome to their 
asylum claim. 
 
More intriguingly from a long-run perspective 
we might have expected geographic variation in 
GDP, see Patrakos et. al. (2005) to be also 
reflected in asylum application elasticises. 
Clearly this is not the case. Analysis of 
elasticises tends to support the view that 
asylum seekers take it that incomes have 
largely evened out in the more developed EEA 
economies – this is the so called neo-classical 
view of economic convergence. Thus, even 
though economic growth effects accumulate in a 
regionally selective manner, see Bradley et. al. 
(2006) in the EEA and growing economies are 
more attractive to asylum seekers, the asylum 
seeker has the same view as the economic 
migrant. That is, when the relative income in 
the host country exceeds that in the home 
country migration occurs. 
 
Clearly in recent years the general economic 
situation has been is flux. This raises a couple of 
interesting short-run questions. First, countries 
experiencing a downturn should see falls in 
applications while those where the economic 
conditions remain favourable might see 
application increase. That is to say a preference 
for one asylum destination over another may be 
influenced by economic conditions. In Table 2 we 
give the actual smoothed per capita asylum 
applications to GDP elasticises for the years 
2006-2009 for the group of 16 countries. It is 
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clear there is an economic preference for asylum 
seekers for the Nordic countries. In Ireland the 
economic conditions have got worse over the 
period while Switzerland has seen its per capita 
GDP in PPS improve by 5% over the same 
period. The elasticises reflect this improvement 
with an increase of 8% from 1.00 to 1.08 
occurring in this time period. Given the steady 
level of per capita asylum applications in most 
countries this acceleration shows that the 
economic preferences of new asylum applicants 
would appear to have recently shifted away from 
Ireland toward Switzerland. However, it 
remains to be seen as to whether this effect is 
permanent. Recently further evidence for this 
shift has emerged from Nigerian asylum 
applications. For the past 10 years Nigerians 
have been the largest nationality group making 
asylum applications in Ireland. Interestingly in 
2009 this number halved while in Switzerland 
they have noticed a large increase in 
applications from Nigerians.  
  
The second question that arises on foot of the 
flux in recent economic conditions is whether 
uncertainty about future economic expectations 
has a bearing on asylum applications. The final 
column of Table 1, labelled ARCH, gives the 
outcome of the test for conditional variance 
which is a measure of future uncertainty. For 
the group of 16 countries the clear picture that 
arises from this test is that in most central EU 
member states the uncertainty remains constant 
over time.  
 
However, it is also clear that there is varying 
uncertainty in asylum applications in Nordic 
countries as well as Malta and Cyprus over time 
in response to uncertainty in economic 
conditions. Figure 3 plots the uncertainty for 
Sweden. The plot shows that the variability 
tends to fall but with a small spike in the early 
nineties, this is probably due to the effect of the 
small sample used to compute the early 
forecasts. It is clear from this that the banking 
crisis in the early 1990s in Nordic countries had 
a small but largely insignificant effect on 
asylum variability in applications. The recent 
Irish banking crisis seems to mirror this in that 
Ireland has not experienced greater variability 
in the number of applications as a consequence 
of uncertainty about the country's future 
economic well being.  
 
Figure 3 
Sweden
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8. Conclusions and Observations 
 
In this paper we have looked at asylum 
application trends across the EEA and related 
them to GDP. Analysis of per capita asylum 
applications showed that Ireland, Belgium and 
the Netherlands appear to be taking a similar 
number of asylum applications in relation to 
their population relative to other EEA states. In 
Austria, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland the 
odds of an asylum application being made there 
is nearly double that of an application being 
made Ireland while in most other countries 
including UK, France and Germany the odds of 
asylum application being made there is just ½ 
that of Ireland’s. 
 
Gerard Keogh 
 17 
Examining the relationship between asylum 
applications and GDP showed a largely similar 
pattern as the analysis based on per capita 
applications alone. Austria, Belgium, Sweden 
and Switzerland are the only countries in the 
'developed box' taking more applications per 
head in relation to their wealth as Ireland. 
Meanwhile the UK, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany and Spain have fewer asylum 
applications in relation to their income. As a 
consequence the notion that better off countries 
are more attractive to asylum seekers was 
shown to be partially true but could not be 
sustained across all developed regions.  
 
The Granger causality analysis showed that 14 
of the 29 countries consider displayed evidence 
of causality between asylum and GDP. Of these 
14 countries 8 are located in Western Europe. 
Invariably the causality found was short term, 
at 1 to 2 year lags.  Long term relationships 
existed between asylum and GDP for 8 countries 
with 6 of these located in Western Europe.    
 
The dynamic analysis of elasticises 
demonstrated that asylum applications are a 
function of economic well being in the previous 
year for a group of 16 countries mainly located 
in Western Europe. In Ireland's case a 1% 
increase in per capita GDP in PPS in any given 
year produces 1.09% increase in per capita 
asylum applications in the following year.   
 
From a more general perspective the long run 
analysis showed that asylum seekers tend to see 
the EEA as economically homogeneous. 
Nevertheless recent relative growth rates 
indicate that economic preferences of new 
asylum seekers appear to have shifted away 
from Ireland and the UK and toward 
Switzerland. 
 
In this study we have shown that there is an 
association and a measurable response in 
asylum applications to movements in GDP. The 
relationships were repeated across several EEA 
countries. Moreover, the long run attraction of 
the EEA as a whole to asylum seekers is a 
phenomenon that is analogous to more general 
migration.  Thus the overall impression that 
arises from this study is that asylum 
applications are driven in part by GDP but that 
this contributory causal relationship varies from 
country to county in the EEA. More recent GDP 
patterns tend to act as random shocks altering 
asylum applications levels in the short run. 
 
Clearly, there is more to asylum applications 
than just GDP. Family ties or looser social 
networks, as well as legislative and 
administrative procedures surrounding asylum, 
are important factors. These topics warrant 
future research. But there are also other global 
and geo-political features. For example, 
Menjivar (1993), in a study on Salvadorian 
refugee migration to the US, shows that 
migrations are seldom the result of a sudden 
crisis, such as a war, but are related to the 
broad historical process in which political and 
economic factors interact. This indicates that 
people become refugees through a decline in 
their freedoms while others, as we have shown 
in this study, are simply impelled to move 
mainly due to economic decline. 
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Appendix: Table A1 - per capita Asylum applications in EEA countries relative to Ireland (1) 
 Year 
Country 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 2009 
Proportion 
of years 
greater 
than 1 Average 
Ireland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.50 1 
Belgium  1.1 1.7 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.7 3.5 0.69 1.4 
Luxembourg 1.0 3.2 3.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.8 3.3 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.6 0.62 1.6 
Netherlands  2.1 2.3 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.1 1.6 0.38 1.0 
Austria  0.8 1.4 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.9 2.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 3.1 0.85 1.8 
Norway  0.5 1.5 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.5 3.5 5.9 0.85 1.8 
Sweden  1.0 1.2 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.9 2.4 1.9 2.7 4.4 3.1 4.3 0.77 2.0 
Switzerland  3.2 4.5 3.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.4 2.5 3.4 0.85 2.0 
Bulgaria  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.00 0.1 
Czech 
Republic  0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.00 0.3 
Denmark  0.9 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.08 0.6 
Germany 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.08 0.5 
Estonia  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 
Finland  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.8 1.8 0.08 0.5 
France  0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.2 0.08 0.5 
Italy  0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.00 0.2 
Latvia    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 
Lithuania  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.00 0.1 
Hungary    0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.00 0.3 
Poland  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.00 0.1 
Portugal  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 
Romania  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.0 
Slovenia  0.0 0.1 0.2 1.6 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.08 0.4 
Slovakia  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 1.0 2.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.15 0.5 
Spain  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.1 
United 
Kingdom  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.00 0.6 
Cyprus    0.3 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.5 3.3 12.5 9.8 5.9 9.5 5.0 5.5 0.58 4.5 
Greece  0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.1 2.5 2.0 2.3 0.31 0.8 
Malta  0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.7 7.2 9.5 0.46 2.4  
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Appendix: Table A2 - Smoothed per capita Asylum applications to GDP ratios in EEA countries relative to Ireland 
 
 
  Year 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Proportion 
of years 
greater 
than 1 Average 
Ireland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 
Luxembourg 0.6 1.4 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.8 
Netherlands 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.4 0.3 1.0 
Norway 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.2 2.3 3.7 0.4 1.2 
Slovakia 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.5 2.2 3.7 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.1 
Austria 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.8 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.7 0.9 1.7 
Belgium 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.8 3.3 0.8 1.4 
Sweden 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.7 2.6 2.7 3.9 3.7 4.6 0.8 2.2 
Switzerland 2.9 3.4 2.8 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 2.2 2.9 1.0 1.9 
Slovenia 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.6 
Germany 2.1 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.8 
Denmark 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.1 0.7 
Finland 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.6 0.1 0.5 
France 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.1 0.6 
Bulgaria       0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 
Czech Rep.       0.5 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.7 
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Hungary         0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.4 0.0 0.6 
Italy 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 
Latvia         0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Lithuania       0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 
Poland 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.3 
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Romania 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Spain 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 
UK 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.6 
Greece 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 3.0 2.8 2.9 0.3 1.1 
Cyprus         1.1 0.7 3.6 12.7 14.7 10.2 13.7 8.5 7.6 0.9 8.1 
Malta       0.3 0.2 0.5 0.9 3.0 4.8 5.8 6.6 11.8 14.5 0.7 4.8  
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Appendix: Table A3a – ADF Unit root, Cointegration and Granger-causality test results 
 
    Causality Direction 
    
ADF Unit Root 
Test 
Integration order 
05.0=α  
Bounds Cointegration Test 
H0: No Cointegration 
F statistic 
05.0=α  Asylum -> GDP GDP -> Asylum 
Country N Asylum GDP 
Accept < 3.79 
Reject > 4.85 
Test 
Result F-prob. Lag F-prob. Lag 
Error 
correction 
term 
(significance 
level) 
Ireland 12 1 1 1.23 Accept  0.94 1 0.95 3 N/A 
Austria 22 1 1 2.96 Accept 0.91 1 0.18 1 N/A 
Belgium 22 1 1 1.94 Accept 0.86 2 0.92 1 N/A 
Bulgaria 10 1 1 3.04 Accept 0.51 1 0.48 2 N/A 
Cyprus 12 1 0 0.42 Accept  0.92 2 0.41 1 N/A 
Czech Rep. 10 1 1 18.90 Reject 0.80 2 0.99 1 0.07 
Denmark 22 1 1 2.52 Accept 0.75 2 0.88 3 N/A 
Estonia 12 1 0 198.6 Reject 0.99 2 0.99 2 N/A 
Finland 22 1 1 5.84 Reject 0.90 2 0.99 1 <0.001 
France 16 1 1 3.85 Undecided 0.84 1 0.99 2 N/A 
Germany 22 1 0 0.82 Accept  0.79 1 0.64 1 N/A 
Greece 22 1 0 4.51 Undecided  0.82 2 0.18 2 N/A 
Hungary 9 1 0 340.0 Reject  0.98 1 0.81 2 N/A 
Italy 22 1 1 4.72 Undecided 0.96 2 0.95 1 0.04 
Latvia 9 0 1 2.52 Accept  0.73 1 0.84 2 N/A 
Lithuania 13 0 1 4.46 Undecided 0.25 1 0.70 1 N/A 
Luxembourg 22 1 1 5.10 Reject 0.90 1 0.17 1 0.02 
Malta 10 1 0 6.52 Reject  0.91 1 0.95 2 N/A 
Netherlands 22 1 1 3.73 Accept 0.55 1 0.97 3 N/A 
Poland 16 1 0 77.1 Reject  0.93 3 0.91 4 N/A 
Portugal 22 1 1 13.86 Reject 0.98 1 0.99 1 0.01 
Romania 16 1 1 2.97 Accept 0.36 1 0.66 2 N/A 
Slovakia 15 1 1 13.39 Reject 0.97 1 0.59 2 0.44 
Slovenia 13 0 1 6.34 Reject  0.96 2 0.18 2 N/A 
Spain 22 1 1 0.84 Accept 0.94 3 0.97 1 N/A 
Sweden 22 1 1 1.87 Accept 0.77 1 0.95 4 N/A 
UK 22 1 1 9.22 Reject 0.77 1 0.95 4 0.02 
Norway 22 1 1 3.90 Undecided 0.71 1 0.65 1 N/A 
Switzerland 21 1 1 7.77 Reject 0.92 2 0.95 3 0.09 
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Appendix: Table A3b – Elliott Rothenburg Stock Unit root, Cointegration and Granger-causality test results 
 
    Causality Direction 
    
ADF Unit Root 
Test 
Integration order 
(lag) 
05.0=α  
Bounds Cointegration Test 
H0: No Cointegration 
F statistic 
05.0=α  Asylum -> GDP GDP -> Asylum 
Country N Asylum GDP 
Accept < 3.79 
Reject > 4.85 
Test 
Result F-prob. Lag F-prob. Lag 
Error 
correction term 
(significance 
level) 
Ireland 12 0 0 N/A - 0.96 2 0.93 4 N/A 
Austria 22 1 1 2.96 Accept 0.91 1 0.18 1 N/A 
Belgium 22 0 0 N/A - 074 1 0.90 2 N/A 
Bulgaria 10 0 0 N/A - 0.82 1 0.65 1 N/A 
Cyprus 12 0 0 N/A - 0.68 2 0.87 2 N/A 
Czech Rep. 10 0 0 N/A - 0.99 1 0.98 2 0.07 
Denmark 22 1 1 2.52 Accept 0.75 2 0.88 3 N/A 
Estonia 12 0 0 N/A - 0.93 3 0.94 2 N/A 
Finland 22 0 1 5.84 Reject 0.73 1 0.99 2 0.03 
France 16 0 1 3.85 Undecided 0.84 1 0.99 2 N/A 
Germany 22 0 0 0.82 Accept  0.24 2 0.87 1 N/A 
Greece 22 0 0 4.51 Undecided  0.81 1 0.96 1 N/A 
Hungary 9 1 1(2) 340.0 Reject  0.99 2 0.89 1 0.03 
Italy 22 0 0 N/A - 0.91 3 0.89 2 0.04 
Latvia 9 0 1 2.52 Accept  0.73 1 0.84 2 N/A 
Lithuania 13 0 0 N/A - 0.38 3 0.96 1 N/A 
Luxembourg 22 0 1 5.10 Reject 0.90 1 0.41 1 0.02 
Malta 10 0 1(2) 6.52 Reject  1.0 1 0.99 1 N/A 
Netherlands 22 0 1 3.73 Accept 0.62 1 0.97 4 N/A 
Poland 16 0 0 N/A - 0.99 1 0.96 1 N/A 
Portugal 22 0 1 13.86 Reject 0.97 3 0.95 2 0.02 
Romania 16 0 0 N/A - 0.74 1 0.98 1 N/A 
Slovakia 15 0 1 13.39 Reject 0.97 1 0.59 2 0.44 
Slovenia 13 0 1 6.34 Reject  0.95 1 0.89 2 N/A 
Spain 22 0 1 0.84 Accept 0.93 3 0.95 1 N/A 
Sweden 22 0 0 N/A - 0.95 3 0.52 2 N/A 
UK 22 0 0 N/A - 0.96 1 0.88 4 0.02 
Norway 22 0 1 3.90 Undecided 0.74 4 0.24 1 N/A 
Switzerland 21 0 1 7.77 Reject 0.95 3 0.52 2 N/A 
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Appendix: Table A4 - Smoothed per capita Asylum applications to GDP elasticises in EEA countries relative to Ireland 
 
 Year  
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cyprus       0.86 0.77 1.08 1.44 1.48 1.40 1.47 1.37 1.29 1.17 
Sweden 0.96 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.90 1.01 1.14 1.14 1.18 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.04 
Norway 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.88 0.90 0.98 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.19 1.24 0.99 
Switzerland 1.02 0.97 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.90 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.13 1.14 0.97 
Belgium 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.95 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.07 1.16 0.95 
Malta 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.60 0.67 0.79 1.04 1.13 1.18 1.20 1.34 1.35 0.94 
Austria 0.87 0.86 0.78 0.84 0.88 0.95 1.06 1.09 1.02 0.99 1.01 1.06 0.94 
Denmark 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.87 0.81 0.87 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.04 0.92 
UK 0.90 0.88 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.88 
Netherlands 1.02 0.92 0.85 0.81 0.73 0.75 0.81 0.87 0.93 0.83 0.94 0.98 0.87 
Slovakia 0.61 0.68 0.67 0.91 0.96 1.07 1.26 1.05 1.00 0.94 0.64 0.57 0.86 
Finland 0.69 0.75 0.71 0.62 0.70 0.76 0.91 0.97 0.92 0.81 0.99 1.11 0.81 
France 0.73 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.79 
Germany 1.00 0.91 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.65 0.72 0.76 
Poland 0.67 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.70 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.91 1.00 1.11 0.75 
Greece 0.59 0.41 0.44 0.53 0.55 0.66 0.64 0.81 0.92 1.07 1.07 1.02 0.70 
Czech Rep.     0.72 0.82 0.72 0.82 0.77 0.71 0.67 0.49 0.48 0.42 0.66 
Hungary       0.80 0.72 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.72 0.81 0.63 
Luxembourg 0.62 0.60 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.56 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.61 
Spain 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.64 0.68 0.55 
Bulgaria     0.63 0.72 0.79 0.58 0.43 0.32 0.26 0.37 0.37 0.43 0.50 
Italy 0.38 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.65 0.66 0.50 
Lithuania     0.32 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.13 -0.01 0.15 0.09 0.52 0.55 0.30 
Latvia       -0.17 -0.02 -0.29 -0.50 -0.17 -0.14 0.14 0.35 0.43 0.27 
Portugal 0.44 0.34 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.27 
Slovenia 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.26 
Romania 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.44 0.19 0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.09 0.33 0.26 0.22 
Estonia         0.02 0.13 0.03 0.06 -0.09 0.18 0.26 0.41 0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
